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TRANSCENDENTALISM, 


BY 



WILLIAM B. GREENE. 


M Rich is that universal self whom thou worshippest as the s6ul. 

The Vedas. 



WEST BROOKFIELD, MASS. 

POWER PRESS OF OLIVER S. COOKE & CO. 

184 >. 





































































































































I. Perhaps some of our readers are still ignorant of the 
meaning of the term Transcendentalism. We will, for 
their sakes, attempt a definition. Transcendentalism is that 
form of Philosophy which sinks God and Nature in man. 
Let us explain. God, man, and nature, in their relations (if 
indeed the absolute God may be said ever to be in relations,) 
are the objects of all philosophy ; but, in different theories, 
greater or less prominence is given to one or the other of 
these three, and thus systems are formed. Pantheism sinks 
man and nature in God ; Materialism sinks God and man 
in the universe ; Transcendentalism sinks God and natnre 
in man. In other words, some, in philosophising, take 
their point of departure in God alone, and are inevitably 
conducted to Pantheism ;—others take their point of de¬ 
parture in nature alone, and are led to Materialism ; others 
start with man alone, and end in Transcendentalism. 

It is by no means difficult to deny in luords , the actual 
existence of the outward universe. We may say, for ex¬ 
ample, that the paper on which we write has no more out¬ 
ward existence than the thoughts we refrain from express- 

* The substance of this tract was originally published in the third and 
ninth numbers of the American Review. 

1 




( 6 ) 

ing ; we may affirm that it has merely a different kind of ex¬ 
istence within our soul. When I say I perceive an out¬ 
wardly existing tree, I may be mistaken,; what I call a tree 
may have no outward existence, but may, on the contrary, 
be created by my perception. Who knows that a thing 
which appears red to me may not appear blue to my neigh¬ 
bor ? If so, then is color something which I lend to the 
object. But why stop at color ? Perhaps hardness and 
weight have no existence save that which the mind gives, 
u Whether nature enjoy a substantial existence without 
(says Mr. Emerson, the profoundest metaphysician, after 
Jonathan Edwards, which this country has ever produced), 
or is only in the apocalypse of the mind, it is alike useful 
and alike venerable to me. Be it what it may, it is ideal 
to me so long as I cannot try the accuracy of my senses.” 
“ What differs it to me (he asks on another page) whether 
Orion be up there in heaven, or some god paint the image 
in the firmament of the soul ?’ ” 

Fabre d’Olivet believed the outward universe to be so 
dependent upon the individual soul that we might properly 
be said to create it ourselves. He thought that we ourselves 
produced all forms and the world, that we might create 
whatever we would, isolatedly and instantaneously, and 
hoped to construct a system of magic on this fact as a basis. 
In truth, if all outward things depend for their being and 
manner of existence upon ourselves, and upon our inward 
states, a change in those states involves a change in outward 
nature. If we discover, therefore, the connection of our 
thoughts and feelings with outward nature, the whole uni¬ 
verse is in our power ; and we may, by a modification of 
ourselves, change the world from its present state into what 
we all wish it might become. Mr. Alcott, (an accomplish¬ 
ed adept in Pantheistic Theosophy) thinks the world would 


( 1 ) 

be what it should be were he only as holy as he should be ; 
he also considers himself personally responsible for the ob¬ 
liquity of the axis of the earth. A friend once told me, 
while we watched the large flakes of snow as they were 
slowly falling, that, could we but attain to the right spiritual 
state, we should be able to look on outward nature, and say, 
41 1 snow, I rain.” To Mr. Emerson a noble doubt per¬ 
petually suggests itself, 44 whether nature outwardly exists.” 
In the eighth number of the Dial we find a beautiful poem 
touching upon this theory, from which we make an ex¬ 
tract :— 


“ All is but as it seems 
The round, green earth, 

With river and glen; 

The din and mirth 
Of busy, busy men ; 

The world’s great fever, 

Throbbing for ever; 

The creed of the sage, 

The hope of the age, 

All things we cherish, 

All that live and all that perish, 

These are but inner dreams. 

“ The great world goeth on 
To thy dreaming. 

To thee alone 

Hearts are making their moan, 

Eyes are streaming. 

Thine is the white moon turning night to day, 
Thine is the dark wood sleeping in her ray; 
Thee the winter chills ; 

Thee the spring time thrills ; 

All things nod to thee— 

All things come to see 
If thou art dreaming on; 

If thy dream should break, 

And thou shouldst awake, 

All things would be gone. 

“ Nothing is if thou art not. 

Thou art under, over all; 

Thou dost hold and cover all; 

Thou art Atlas—Thou art Jove— 

The mightiest truth 

Hath all its youth 

From thy enveloping thought.” 


( 8 ) 

Thus man is made to be the only real existence, and out¬ 
ward nature a mere phenomenon dependent upon him. Man 
exists really, actually, absolutely ; but nature is an accident, 
an appearance, a consequent upon the existence of the hu¬ 
man soul. Thus is the universe sunk, swallowed up, in 
man. The concluding seven lines of the extract are an ex¬ 
ample of the Transcendental Theology, an example of the 
swallowing up of God himself in man. 


Materialism makes man the result of organization, deny¬ 
ing the existence of separate and individual souls, and thus 
sinks man in nature : it also identifies God with the active 
powers of the universe. As Pantheism sinks man and na¬ 
ture in God, as Materialism sinks God and man in the uni¬ 
verse, so Transcendentalism sinks God and nature in man. 
It must be confessed, however, that our Transcendentalists 
are, by no means, consistent. Sometimes they express 
themselves in a way that leaves us in doubt whether they 
are not, at bottom, Materialists. For example, the poem 
from which the foregoing extracts are quoted, is followed 
by another, of the same author, made up of beautiful and 
clear statements, where, in the midst of explicit repudia¬ 
tions of Transcendentalism, traces of the sensual system of 
D’ Holbach are distinctly visible. We quote a few lines :— 

“ Dost thou dream that thou art free, 

Making, destroying, all that thou dost see, 

In the unfettered might of thy soul’s liberty ? 

Lo ! an atom crushes thee, 

One nerve tortures and maddens thee, 

One drop of blood is death to thee. 

The mighty voice of nature, 

Is thy parent, not thy creature, 

Is no pupil, but thy teacher; 

And the world would still move on 
Were thy soul forever flown. 

For while thou dreamest on, enfolded 
In nature’s wide embrace, 

All thy life is daily moulded 
By her informing grace, 


( 9 ) 


And time and space must reign 
And rule o’er thee for ever, 

And the outworld lift its chain 
From off thy spirit never.” 

Here the soul is evidently sunk in nature ; it is, to use a 
mathematical expression, considered as a function of the 
universe. 

II. Having spoken of some of the peculiar characteris¬ 
tics of the Transcendental school of philosophy, we shall 
now” take occasion to say a few words concerning its origin 
and progress. But here it will be necessary to speak of the 
philosophy of Kant, a subject not easily handled. The 
fundamental postulate of the philosopher of Konigsberg 
may, however, initiate the reader into the whole system. 
Here it is, as near as we recollect it. 

“ If any truth be present to the mind with a conviction of its universality 
and necessity, that truth was derived to the mind from its own operations, 
and does not rest upon observation and experience : 

“ And, conversely, if any truth be present to the mind with a conviction 
of its contingency, that truth was derived to the mind from observation 
and experience, and not from the operations of the mind itself.” 

For example, we know that every effect must have its cause, 
and this truth lies in the mind with a conviction of its uni¬ 
versality and necessity ; this truth is derived, therefore, 
not from observation and experience, but from the opera¬ 
tions of the mind itself; it is born not from outward nature, 
but in and from the mind itself. In other words, to pass to 
the technology of the Scotch School, we are forced by the 
very constitution of our being, to admit this truth, so that 
the principle of causation may be said to be a law of our in¬ 
tellectual natures. 

On the other hand, we say, We know the sun will rise to¬ 
morrow ; but we are not absolutely certain of this fact. 


( 10 ) 


This second truth lies therefore in our minds with a convic¬ 
tion of its contingency, and not of its necessity, and is, con¬ 
sequently, not derived from a law of our intellectual natures, 
but from observation and experience. 

By every fact of experience a revelation is made to the 
soul, not only of the idea which it has appropriated to itself, 
but also of those conditions of the external world, and of its 
own nature, which rendered that acquisition possible. For 
example, when we perceive moonlight, it is necessary, (1) 
that there should be something out of us to produce the ef¬ 
fect of moonlight upon our sensibility; and also, (2), cer¬ 
tain internal faculties which are receptive of the influences 
of moonlight. Without the outward object there is no per¬ 
ception, and without the inward faculties there is likewise no 
perception; for the moon shines upon the trees as well as 
upon me, but the trees do not perceive, being devoid of the 
perceiving faculty. Now the idea I have of moonshine 
might have been modified by a change either, first, in the 
outward object, or, second, in my perceiving faculty. Had 
tbe moonshine been different, it would have produced a dif¬ 
ferent effect upon my sensibility, and, consequently, the idea 
would have been different, the influence or effect of the 
moonshine would have been different, and the idea resulting 
would likewise have been different. All this is plain. Now 
the faculties of the mind are permanent, and always operate 
in the same manner ; therefore, the truths given by the fac¬ 
ulties, where nothing from the external world intervenes, 
are universal and necessary. But the outward world is al¬ 
ways changing ; therefore, the truths given by observation 
and experience are always contingent. Perhaps we can 
make this plainer by an illustration. 

Our readers have undoubtedly seen machines for cutting 


( 11 ) 


nails ; if they have not, the consequence is by no means 
grave, for the instrument may be easily described. A nail- 
machine is composed of a pair of shears, which are made 
to work up and down, sometimes by steam, sometimes by 
water-power. A man stands before the machine and inserts 
the end of an iron plate between the two parts of the shears 
when they open—when the shears shut, they cut oft a nail 
from this plate, and this nail depends for its size and shape 
upon the form of the shears.—The machine is in operation : 
the plate is inserted, and the machine says. I perceive some¬ 
thing hard, black, cold—what is this something 1 perceive ? 
Down come the shears, the nail is cut off, and rattles away 
into the box. Ah, ha ! says the machine, I now begin to 
see into the mystery of those same perceptions of which I 
was conscious a moment ago. It was a tenpenny nail that 
produced the impressions, a long and four-sided substance, 
sharp at one end, and flat at the other. By this time the 
shears come down again, and the machine says, Another ten- 
penny nail, by all that is glorious ! This acquisition of 
knowledge is beginning to be interesting—I must know a 
little more of the philosophy of this business. So the ma¬ 
chine goes on to soliloquise.—Listen ! 

I have now, says the machine, in my experience, memo¬ 
ry, or nail box, several tenpenny nails. These were un¬ 
doubtedly acquired from the external world, and are all that 
I have as yet acquired from that world. Therefore, if 
aught beside tenpenny nails exist in the external world, I 
have no conception of such existence, and that world is, 
consequently, for me, a collection of tenpenny nails. The 
following appear, therefore, to be unvarying laws of actual 
existence : (1), all things are long and four sided, and ( 2) i 
all things are sharp at one end, and flat at the other. 

But stop ! says the machine—let us beware of hasty in¬ 
ductions. An idea strikes me ! About these same nails : 
I am not so clear that they were not formed by the concur- 


( 12 ) 

rent action of two agents. Perhaps the material was fur- 
nished by external nature, while the form resulted from the 
law of my nature, the constitution of my shears, of my own 
nail-making being. The following conclusion, at least, can¬ 
not be shaken :—I may look upon every nail from two dis¬ 
tinct points of view—first, as to its material, and second, as 
to its form ; the material undoubtedly comes from without, 
and is variable ; some nails are of brass, some are of iron ; 
but the form is invariable, and comes from within. All my 
nails must be long, and four sided, and that universally and 
necessarily ; but the material may vary, being sometimes 
brass, sometimes iron. This is plain ; for I acquire all my 
nails according to the law of my nail-making being ; that is, 
being translated from scientific into popular language, ac¬ 
cording to the form of my shears. After mature delibera¬ 
tion, I think I may take the following postulate as the foun¬ 
dation of all my ulterior philosophy. 

“ Whatever 1 may find in my nail-box, whether nails or whatever else 
relating to nails, if I am convinced that it is what it is necessarily, and 
must be as it is universally, that same thing, whatever it is, Avas not de¬ 
rived to my nail-box from external nature, but finds the reason of its ex* 
istence in the formation and shape of my shears. 

“ And, conversely, whatever I may find in that same nail-box, which is 
neither necessary nor universal, but variable and contingent, has its origin, 
and the reason of its existence, not in the formation and shape of my shears, 
but in the external world.” 

Having relieved itself of this postulate, the machine con¬ 
tinues its meditations in silence. 

The difference between the postulate of the nail-machine 
and that of the Konigsberg philosopher, is by no means 
great. Let us use them both in endeavouring to get at 
clearer conception of the position of our transcendental 
friends. 


( 13 ) 

Do vve not see all material objects under the relations of 
space ? Is not space a necessary and universal form of all 
our sensible perceptions ? But what says the postulate ? 
The notion of space cannot come from the external world ; 
for, if it did, it would not be attended with the conviction 
of universality and necessity with which it is attended. The 
notion of space comes then from the mind, and not at all 
from the outward world. (We speak as a Kantian.) Space 
then has no outward existence, and the supposition that it 
has, is the merest hypothesis imaginable. The arguments 
brought to prove such a position fall at once to the ground, 
for we have before proved that all our notion of space comes 
from within ; and any inference from the within to the with¬ 
out, is utterly invalid. We may treat time in the same man¬ 
ner, for time is the medium in which, universally, and neces¬ 
sarily, we perceive events. Sensible objects and events, 
are the iron, brass, the material of ideas—space and time 
are the form impressed by the shears. After all, what can 
we make of time and space ? Simply this : time and space 
are the color of the intellectual spectacles through which we 
look on outward nature ; they have no real existence, but 
are distorting media which we spread before our eyes when¬ 
ever we look on the outward. (We give the Kantian state¬ 
ment.) 

But it is impossible for any one to remain satisfied amid 
the skepticisms which arise from a denial of the real exist¬ 
ence of space and time. If space and time are mere dis¬ 
torting media, through which we perceive outward nature, 
all our sensible perceptions are erroneous ; and, if no new 
method of acquiring knowledge can be discovered, we may 
as well doubt of every thing. What shall we do then ? This 
is the question asked by our Trancendentalists. The first 
course which presents itself to the mind, is that of endeavor- 
2 


( 14 ) 

ing to eliminate the elements of space and time from all our 
perceptions ; but this is evidently impossible : we must, 
therefore, endeavor to transcend them. But how can we 
transcend space and time ? This also is evidently impossi¬ 
ble ; and the nearest approach to such a transcendent posi¬ 
tion, is a self-deception by which we persuade ourselves 
that we have attained it while we ignore every thing that tends 
to convince us that we have not left our stand-point. The 
confused system of things seen from the point of view which 
seems to transcend space and time, gives us Trancenden- 
dentalism. But why will this system sink God and nature 
in man ? For this reason—When a man has cut himself 
off from every thing which is not himself, (which he must 
do if he attempt to transcend space and time) be must find 
the reason of all things in himself. But the reason of God 
and the universe are not to be found in man, and, if we 
seek them there, we shall deny both God and the universe, 
putting some chimera, which does find its reason in man, in 
their place and stead. Transcendentalism is, therefore, a 
sort of human Pantheism, requiring a conception of contra¬ 
dictions in the same subject. 

To follow a transcendental writer, we must not endeavor 
to find the logical connection of his sentences, for there is 
no such logical connection, and the writer himself never in¬ 
tended there should be. We ought rather to transcend 
space and time (if indeed we can,) and follow him there. 
A transcendentalist never reasons ; he describes what he 
sees from his own point of view. So the word Transcen¬ 
dentalism relates not to a system of doctrines but to a point 
of view ; from which, nevertheless, a system of doctrines 
may be visible. This explains to us why so many, notwith¬ 
standing their desire, have been unable to read the writings 
of the new school. They have tried to find a system of 


( 15 ) 

doctrines where they ought to have looked for a point of 
view. 

But to return to our postulate. We see every thing ac¬ 
cording to the law of cause and effect. The fact of causa¬ 
tion is universal and necessary ; for every fact of experi¬ 
ence gives us, on one side, its material, which comes from 
the out-world, and on the other its form, which comes al¬ 
ways in part from the law of causation. Let the reader 
turn for a moment to the postulate of the nail-machine. He 
will find that every truth which lies in the mind with a con¬ 
viction of its universality and necessity, is derived to the 
mind from its own operations, and that it does not rest at 
all on observation and experience. But does not the truth 
that every effect must have its cause, lie in the mind with a 
conviction of its universality and necessity ? The conse¬ 
quence is clear. The law of causation is another distorting 
medium through which we look upon the out-world, and we 
have no legitimate authority for affirming that the external 
world is in any way subjected to that law. It is true that 
we are forced to look upon nature under that relation, but 
the necessity of the case arises not from the fact of the re¬ 
ality of the law of causation, {we speak as a Kantian,) but 
from the constitution of our nature. But here all positive 
knowledge is annihilated. An idea is good and valid, if we 
may have any confidence in these forms of the soul ; but 
what is the relation of the form of the shears to the outward 
object independent of the machine ? Who shall infer from 
the inward to the outward ? 

The system of Kant is one vast skepticism ; admit the 
fatal postulate, and there is no dodging the conclusion. It 
will be seen that our transcendentalists have not been un¬ 
faithful to the thought of their master. 


✓ 


[ 16 ] 

Transcendentalism affirms that the soul creates all things— 
man, the universe, all forms, all changes ; and that this won¬ 
derful power is possessed by each individual soul. But, it 
may be asked, will there not then be necessarily a confu¬ 
sion, a mixture of universes, arising from the conflict of the 
creative energies of distinct souls ? This difficulty may be 
made to vanish. Suppose, for a moment, that I have a 
magical power over some great public building, the City 
Hall for example ; suppose every one of its parts, by a pre¬ 
existing harmony, to be made obedient to my will, so that 
when I will the windows to open and shut, the doors to turn 
on their hinges, &c., they immediately do it. Would not 
this City Hall, thus immediately obedient to my will, be a 
new body with which I am invested ? Suppose I have 
power over a dog in the moon, so that he barks, runs, wags 
his tail, according to the action of my will, am I not exist¬ 
ing “ in this dim spot which men call earth,” and also, at 
the same time, in “ the orbed maiden whom mortals call 
the moon ? f ’ In the first case I exist as a man, in the 
second as an animal of the canine species. Without doubt, 
I may have millions of bodies ; there is no difficulty in the 
matter ; all that I operate upon by immediate magical power, 
by magici , to use the technology of Jacob Behmen, is to me 
a body. So I may be in this world a man, and in the moon 
a dog ; yet am I not two, but one, for one soul animates the 
two bodies. But mark ! While I am immersed in things 
of time and sense, paying no regard to the soul, which is un¬ 
der and behind all, I think the man who is now moving about, 
trading and traveling on earth, to be myself, and only after 
deep thought, fasting, and meditation, do I find that I am 
also a dog. But here mysteries thicken. I am not only 
both a man and a dog, I am also neither a man nor a dog ; 
for I am the soul that speaks through both. “What we 
commonly call man (says Mr. Emerson) the eating, drink- 


( 17 ) 

ing, planting, counting man, does not as we know him rep¬ 
resent himself, but misrepresents himself. Him we do not 
respect; but the soul, whose organ he is, would he let it 
appear through his action, would make our knees bend.” 
The man, therefore, who has attained to right knowledge, 
is aware that there is no such thing as an individual soul. 
There is but one soul, which is the “ Over Soul,” and this 
one soul is the animating principle of all bodies. When I 
am thoughtless, and immersed in things which are seen, I 
mistake the person who is now writing this notice, for my¬ 
self ; but when I am wise, this illusion vanishes like the 
mists of the morning, and then I know that what I thought 
to be myself, was only one of my manifestations, only a 
mode of my existence. It is I who bark in the dog, grow 
in the tree, and murmur in the passing brook. Think not, 
my brother, that thou art diverse and alien from myself; it 
is only while we dwell in the outward appearance that we 
are two ; when we consider the depths of our being, we are 
found to be the same, for the same self, the same vital prin¬ 
ciple, animates us both. (We speak as a Transcendental- 
ist.) I create the universe, and thou, also, my brother, 
createst the same ; for we create not two universes but one, 
for we two have but one soul : there is but one creative en- 
ergy, which is above, and under, and through all. 

This is no new theory : this doctrine was well known in 
the East, before history began ; no man can tell when it 
arose, for it is as old as thought itself. “ Rich, (say the 
Vedas) is that universal self, whom thou worshipest as the 
soul.” We should strive, therefore, to disentangle ourselves 
from the world of matter, from the bonds of time and space, 
that we may take our stand at once in the ‘ Over-soul,’ 
which we are, did we but know it. We are the Over-soul, 
and we come in our own native home, when we attain to our 
2 * 



( 18 ) 

true point of view, where the whole universe is seen to be 
our body. Then do we know of a truth that it is we who 
think, love, laugh, bark, growl, run, crawl, rain, snow, &c. 
&c. Mr. Emerson has given a beautiful expression to this 
thought : 

“ There is no great and no small 
To the soul that maketh all: 

And where it cometh, all things are; 

And it cometh every where. 

u There is one mind,” says Mr. Emerson, in his Essay 
on History, “common to all individual men. Every man 
is an inlet to the same, and to all of the same. He that is 
once admitted to the right of reason, is made a freeman of 
the whole estate. What Plato has thought, he may think ; 
what a saint has felt, he may feel ; what at any time has be¬ 
fallen any man, he can understand. Who hath access to 
this Universal Mind, is a party to all that hath or can be 
done, for this is the only and sovereign agent.” 

It may easily be seen that this amounts to an identifica¬ 
tion of man with God ; yet this system is by no means Pan¬ 
theistic ; perhaps, indeed, we may be permitted to coin a 
new term, and call it Human Pantheism. Pantheism sinks 
man in God—makes him to be a phenomenon of the Divine 
existence—but this system, so far from being an absorption 
of humanity in God, is an absorption of God in the human 
soul. A pantheistic friend once explained to me the differ¬ 
ence between his system and that of the Transcendentalists. 
u I hold myself,” said he, “ to be a leaf, blown about by 
the winds of change and circumstance, and holding to the 
extreme end of one of the branches of the tree of universal 
existence ; but these gentlemen (referring to the Transcen¬ 
dentalists), think themselves to be some of the sap. 

IV. Let us go up higher, and examine this doc- 


( 19 ) 

trine as it manifested itself in the Oriental World : let us 
examine it in its bearings upon the problem of the soul’s 
future existence. It is written in the Vedas, u The soul 
should be known, that is, it should be distinguished from 
nature ; for then it will not return, it will not return.” In 
this passage, under a form peculiar to the East, we find the 
enunciation of one of the fundamental problems of philoso¬ 
phy (that of the immortality of the soul) with an indication 
of its solution. It is the general belief of the Orientals, 
that the soul of a dying man, after leaving this present 
body, will be born again into the world under some new 
form. A man, in his next body, may be a horse, or a dog, 
and this re-birth, whether in the old or under a new form, is 
the return of the soul. The expiation of certain crimes 
consists, according to the description in the laws of Menfi, 
in the soul’s living a thousand successive lives, in the bodies 
of a thousand different .spiders. This is a specimen of the 
return. The prospect, therefore, is by no means agreeable, 
and we cannot wonder that the whole force of the Oriental 
mind should have been directed to the discovery of some 
means whereby the return of the soul might be avoided. 

But, before we go further, let us examine this doctrine of 
the transmigration of souls, to see whether it really be so 
devoid of plausibility as we sometimes suppose. In all 
ages of the world there have been philosophers who held 
that the soul built the body , that is, that the character and 
form of the body was dependent on the character of the 
soul. The diametrically opposite doctrine is, indeed, more 
fashionable at this time ; for many of our phrenologists and 
other materialists, believe that it is the body which builds the 
Soul , that is, that the soul is a function of (dependent upon) 
some portion of the organism,—say the brain for example. 
An appeal is made, in both cases, to observation and expe¬ 
rience. The phrenologist, from an examination of the 


N 


( 20 ) 

skull, will give a pretty shrewd guess as to the character of 
its owner ; the idealist-will call our attention to the fact that 
the indulgence of certain passions will alter the conformation 
of the face, the expression of the figure. The man who 
acquires the disposition of a fox, will begin to look like a 
fox—will begin to become a fox as far as such a transform¬ 
ation is compatible with human nature. It is in the nature 
of Spirit, says the Idealist, to express itself in some form, 
and, as we are all rendered free at death, why should we 
not, in the next birth, take the form best adapted to express 
our inward natures ? Why should not the man, who is, in 
heart, a fox, take, in the next birth, the outward form of a 
fox ? why should not a fierce bloody man be born the next 
time as a bull-dog ; and a woman, who has no desire, ex¬ 
cept for dress and display, be born as a peacock ? Are 
their souls immortal ? Yea, verily, but their preaent desires 
will remain with them, for their happiness or misery, through¬ 
out eternity. Conversely, a man of pure and angelic char¬ 
acter begins inevitably to present a pure and angelic appear¬ 
ance, the countenance becomes placid, the manner sedate, 
and the soul of the man transforms the body till it becomes 
as angelic as is compatible with its present relations. And 
when it assumes a new form after death, what shall prevent 
it from assuming the one most appropriate to its nature ? 

Our Transcendentalism, hold not only that the soul builds 
the body, but that it builds all things, God, the universe, 
other men, &c. ' “ In the order of thought (says Mr. Em¬ 
erson,) the materialist takes his departure from the external 
world, and esteems a man as one product of that. The 
Idealist takes his departure from his consciousness, and 
reckons the world as an appearance .... The experience 
of the Idealist inclines him to behold the procession of facts 
you call the world, as flowing perpetually outward from an 


( 21 ) 

invisible unsounded centre in himself, centre alike of him 
and of them, and necessitating him to regard all things as 
having a subjective or relative value, relative to that afore¬ 
said unknown centre of him.” This doctrine of Mr. Em¬ 
erson leads either to a denial of a future life , or to the 
doctrine of transmigration ; for if the soul builds the body, 
and continues to live, it must inevitably assume, in the next 
state, a form appropriate to its nature.* But, why, you 
ask, may not a Transcendentalist say that the soul assumes 
a spiritual body, in the old-fashioned heaven ? If the 
Transcendentalist takes this ground, he will furnish at once 
the means, not only for the immediate destruction of a whole 
wing of his school, but also for ultimately sapping the entire 
system. For in admitting the old-fashioned heaven, he must 
acknowledge also the possibility of the old-fashioned special 
communications from the spiritual world to saints and pro¬ 
phets. He must thus admit the logical basis of the old- 
fashioned orthodoxy, inspiration, &c., and what will he do 
in the controversy that ensues ? But it is not necessary to 
push this inquiry ; we know of no passage in the writings of 
any transcendental writer which asserts the doctrine of a fu¬ 
ture life to the individual soul. We have no reason to be¬ 
lieve that any of them hold the doctrine. The future state 
is, for them, not one of life, but one of persistence of es¬ 
sence. 

This theory that the soul builds the body, is connected 
with a vast system, wdiich we have not time to examine ; but 
a little thought will convince the reader that it is as plausible 
and as true as the other doctrine, that the body builds the 
soul ; in short, subjective-idealism is just as true as material- 

* We confess to the confusion in these sentences: but how shall we hear in 
mind that all souls are the same soul, even while we are speaking of them 
as individual and distinct ? The Transcendentalists do not acknowledge 
the existence of distinct individual souls, and, therefore, they can attribute 
immortality to the one soul only, who is God. 


( 22 ) 

ism, and we may add, just as false. As is evident, ii we 
start with man alone, our reasonings will leave us, at the end, 
in Transcendentalism, (subjective-idealism,) and, if we 
take our departure in nature alone we end of necessity in 
materialism ; both partial, exclusive, and inadequate sys¬ 
tems. The fact is, the body builds the soul, and the soul 
builds the body, but it is God who builds both. 

V. What reasoning, what train of thought, lay in the 
minds of the writers of the Vedas when they explained the 
method to be followed by men desirous of avoiding a return 
into this evil mansion of pain ? Why did they suppose that 
a distinction of the soul from nature, by the exercise of 
thought, would be sufficient to overcome this necessity of a 
return 9 We shall endeavor in the following pages to give 
an answer to these questions. But it will be necessary to 
explain some of the peculiarities of the Oriental philosophy, 
that the reader may readily understand the somewhat obscure 
texts we shall find it necessary to quote. 

What is the invisible world of the Orientals ? This in¬ 
visible world , is identical with the world of potential exist¬ 
ences, it is identical with the abyss of Jacob Behrnan and 
John Pordage. These three expressions, the invisible 
world, the potential world, and the abyss, (which last term 
we prefer, as being more expressive,) are names indicating 
one identical thing in the universe of reality—we do not say 
in the universe of actuality. 

What then is meant by the term, the abyss 9 Suppose, 
in thought, this visible universe to be broken. Let all the 
qualities by which we distinguish the differences subsisting 
among the different bodies of nature, cease to manifest them¬ 
selves. Let all properties, all activities in nature, reenter 
into themselves. Let all that by which each manifests its 


( 23 ) 


own proper existence, reenter the virtual state, so that all 
properties, all activities, exist no longer in act, but only in 
the power of acting. Like a circle that contracts more and 
more till it vanishes in its own center ; let all extensions 
contract into—into what, O ye Powers ! Let all qualities 
derived from extension, or which are manifested to us 
through extension, enter again into themselves. Let, in 
short, all properties of things be only in potentiality of man¬ 
ifestation. The reader must endeavor to effect these oper¬ 
ations in thought. 

f But perhaps it will be well to define some of our terms. 
What is essence What is existence ? What is the differ¬ 
ence in signification between the terms essence and existence ? 
Essence is pure being, without efflux or manifestation. Exist¬ 
ence involves out-going or manifestation. The soul of man, 
and every other substance, according to the foundation of 
jts being, according to its center or root, is; but according 
to its out-goings, manifestations, or operations, it exists. 

What is potential existence ? What is actual existence ? 
What is the difference between potential and actual exist¬ 
ence ? A thing exists potentially , or in potentia , when it is 
possible only. This same thing exists actually when it has 
not only this possible (potential) existence, but also a real 
existence in act. 

A thing is, when in potentia , or when possessing only a 
possible existence ; but it exists , when it has not only its root 
of substance or being, but also an actual manifestation.] 

When all outward things exist only in potentiality of man¬ 
ifestation, or, in short, when all things exist only in potentia, 
man also must cease from all actual existence ; and must re¬ 
enter the potential state. In fact, how does man act, how 


( 24 ) 

does he manifest himself ? He moves, eats, drinks, thinks, 
wills, remembers, hopes, loves, desires, &c. But can a 
man eat without eating something, or can he drink if he do 
not drink something ? Can he move without moving through 
some space, or moving something, viz. : his body ? Can he 
love, hope, desire, think, without thinking, hoping, loving, 
desiring, something ? When all things are in the potential 
state, this something, which is necessary to all his actions, 
is withdrawn, and, as man cannot act or manifest himself, 
without the concurrence of this something, he must also him¬ 
self cease from all action, all manifestation—he must him¬ 
self, in like manner reenter the potential state. Conceive, 
if you can, that you are removed in some distant region of 
space where nothing can come into contact w T ith you, where 
the light of the stars of heaven is extinguished, where the 
undulations of the all-pervading ether cease to operate, 
where all motion, all change, all springing sources, have re¬ 
entered into themselves ; conceive, also, your memory to 
be so blotted out that the voices of the past sound no long¬ 
er ; conceive that no fact remains present to the mind on 
which to base an inference in regard to the future. Would 
you live, act, think or desire ? Of what would you think, 
or lohat would you desire ? All these objects of thought 
and desire have entered, according to the supposition, into 
the potential state, and manifest themselves no longer to 
you. Evidently you have entered, as far as is possible this 
side the gates of death, into the potential state, into the in¬ 
visible world, into the abyss. 

When we thus conceive this universe to be broken, to 
have returned into its original essence, but non-existence— 
when we conceive man also to have ceased from all actual 
existence—we shall perceive all our representations, human¬ 
ity, the outward world, ourselves, all thought, all desire, re- 


( 25 ) 

entering into each other, so as to exist thenceforth only in 
germ, only in potentiality of existence. Man and the uni¬ 
verse will he effaced together—all things will enter the po¬ 
tential state simultaneously ; for the human intelligence re¬ 
flects the universe, and the reentering of the universe into 
the potential slate will be maiked by the smooth surface of 
the mirror (the mind of man) which gives thenceforth no re¬ 
flection, which marks thenceforth no change. 

Thus beings become one being, in potentiality of manifes¬ 
tation. Yet when we say one being, our words must not 
be taken with too much strictness. Nature and man have 
reentered into themselves, and all things exist only in po- 
tentia; they have become one being, insomuch as each is 
now a cause existing in potentiality of operation —one being, 
inasmuch as these causes are undistinguishable the one from 
the other, since all that can effect a distinction is swallowed 
up in the abyss of potentiality. But they are many beings, 
insomuch as they are the potentiality of a world involving 
diversity and change. 

This one being, this world in polentia , is the abyss of 
Jacob Behman, the invisible world of the Orientals. 

« X am (says Kreeshna, in the Bhagvat Geeta,) in like manner, that 
which is the seed of all things in nature; and there is nothing, whether 
animate or inanimate, which is without me. But what, O Arjoon , hast 
thou to do with this manifold wisdom ? I planted the universe with a 
single portion and stood still. [The son of Pandoo then beheld within 
the mighty compound being, within the bodv of the God of gods, standing 
together, the whole universe, divided fortli into its vast variety.] I see 
thyself (says Arjoon) on all sides of infinite shape, formed with abundant 
arms, and bellies, and mouths, and eyes; but I can neither discover thy 
beginning, thy middle, nor again thy end, O universal Lord, form of the 
nniverse!” 

The following passage is clear, and shows the distinction 
between the potential and actual worlds, the first being the 
3 


substance and seed of the latter, and the latter being the 
former drawn out into actual relations. 

“ They who are acquainted with day and night, know that a day of 
Brahma is a thousand revolutions of the Yoogs, and that his night extend- 
eth for a thousand more. On the coming forth of that day all things pro¬ 
ceed from invisibility to visibilty; so, on the approach of night, they are 
all dissolved away into that which is called invisible. The universe even, 
having existed, is again dissolved; and now again, on the approach of day, 
by divine necessity, it is reproduced. That which, upon the dissolution of 
all things else, is not destroyed, is superior and of another nature from 
that visibility ; it is invisible and eternal. He who is thus called invisible 
and incorruptible, is even he who is called the supreme abode; which men, 
having once obtained, they never more return to the earth: that is my man¬ 
sion. That Supreme Being is to be obtained by him that worshipeth no 
other gods. In him is included all nature, by him all things are spread 
abroad.” 

We will give a few more extracts from the Bhagvat 
Geeta : 

“The great Brahm (says Kreeshna) is my womb. In it I place my 

foetus, and from it is the production of all nature.I am generation 

and dissolution; the place where all things are reposited, and the inex¬ 
haustible seed of all nature. I am sunshine, and I am rain. I now draw 
in, and I now let out. I am death and immortality. I am entity and 
non-entity.The ignorant, being unacquainted with my supreme na¬ 

ture, which is superior to all things, and exempt from decay, believe me, 
who am invisible, to exist in the visible form under which they see me. . . . 
I am the creation and the dissolution of the whole universe. There is not 
anything greater than I; and all things hang on me, even as precious gem# 
on a string. I am moisture in the water, light in the sun and moon, invo¬ 
cation in th$ Vedas , sound in the firmament, human nature in mankind. 
In all things I am life, and I am zeal in the zealous; and know, O Arjoon, 

that I am the eternal seed of all nature.I will now tell the what is 

Gnea , or the object of wisdom, from which understanding thou wilt enjoy im¬ 
mortality. This is that which has no beginning and is separate, even 
Brahm , who can neither be called sat (ens) nor asat (non ens). Unattach¬ 
ed, it containeth all things, and without quality, it partaketh of every qual¬ 
ity. It is undivided, yet in all things it standeth divided. It is wisdom, 
that which is the object of wisdom, and that which is to be obtained by 
wisdom.” 





( 27 ) 

VI. Some of the heretical sects supposed the abyss, 
the invisible or poteniial world, to be the supreme God. It 
is evident, that the Bhagvat Geeta, from which the forego¬ 
ing extracts are made, is not exempt from the influence of 
this error. But the abyss cannot be God ; for God is alive, 
while the abyss is unquestionably dead. The abyss has 
only a nugatory and potential existence, itself being the 
mere potentiality of the universe, while God, on the other 
hand, exists always in act. But, perhaps, it may be said 
that the abyss is alive , and that, in truth, it is itself the only 
life, that it passes always, by virtue of inhering necessity, 
into act, imparting life by that passage to all vital agents in 
the visible universe. This would be a statement of the fa¬ 
tal pantheism which has always reigned in the East, a pan¬ 
theism somewhat similar to that of the Hegelians, and 
almost identical with that of a portion of our New England 
Transcendentalists. We will endeavor to render this mat¬ 
ter a little more clear. 

We read in the writings of Dupuis, the materialist, 
“ amid the shadows of a dark night, when the heavens are 
covered with a thick cloud, when all bodies have disappear¬ 
ed from our eyes, and we seem to dwell alone with our¬ 
selves and with the black shadows which surround us, what 
is then the measure of our existence ? How much does it 
differ from an entire annihilation, especially when memory 
and thought do not surround us with the images of objects 
which the day has revealed to us ? Jill is dead to us, and 
we ourselves are, in a certain manner, dead to nature . 
What can give us life, and draw our soul from this mortal 
weakness which chains down its activity in the shadows of 
chaos ? A single ray of light can restore us to ourselves, 
and to nature, which seemed so far removed from us. Be¬ 
hold the principle of our true existence, without which our 


( 28 ) 

life would he but the sentiment of a prolonged ennui. It is 
this need of light, it is its creative energy, which has been 
felt by all men, for they have seen nothing more frightful 
than its absence. Behold their first Divinity, whose bril¬ 
liant splendor, sparkling forth from the bosom of chaos, 
caused to proceed thence man and the universe, according 
to the theological principles of Orpheus and of Moses. ,, 
The thought here expressed is simple, but its power is in¬ 
exhaustible, infinite! We will not dwell on the view of 
the nature of Life which is so clearly and beautifully ex¬ 
pressed, nor upon the misapprehension of the theology of 
Moses, so manifest in the concluding line. But we would 
ask Dupuis, is there nothing but light which can expel this 
obscure gloom ? is there nothing but light which can deliver 
man from this nugatory abyss of potential existence ? How 
much is involved in the expression, u especially when me¬ 
mory and thought do not surround us with the image of ob¬ 
jects which the day has revealed to us ?” A single ray of 
light would indeed restore us to reality, to communion with 
nature, but would not the remembrance of a single object 
seen through the day, awaken the soul to a real life, though 
not to an immediate communion with nature? While we are 
in this state of darkness and of silence, this state of dream¬ 
ing without dreams, the whole expanse , if we may so speak, 
of memory, is spread before the inner eye, but without 
form, and, as it were, void. No distinct image is present 
to the mind, and all our conceptions lie in the memory and 
imagination, (which is another form, or rather a modifica¬ 
tion of memory,) in the mere potentiality of existence as 
actual conceptions. If we begin to act mentally, if we be¬ 
gin to form to ourselves a picture or conception, the facts 
of memory rise up before us, and taking the isolated 
parts, we bring them together—perhaps in new forms, by the 


( 29 ) 


exercise of imagination, perhaps in the reproduction of some 
well known collocation, by the exercise of simple memory. 


This vast, and apparently empty, (as in the case sup¬ 
posed by Dupuis,) expanse of memory, which stretches out 
before the inward eye when we seem to cease from all 
thought, is as the invisible or potential world, as the abyss. 
This empty expanse , containing the germ of all our concep¬ 
tions, is a similitude, a correspondency, with the invisible 
world, of the Orientals. But the invisible world is the 
seed of all nature, while the vacant expanse, or world, of 
memory and imagination, is finite, and the seed of the con¬ 
ceptions of the individual man only. As the whole uni¬ 
verse is contained, in potentia, in the abyss, so, in this field 
of memory, are contained potentially all those elements 
which go to make up the conceptions formed by the mind 
when it enters into operation. It will be well for the rea¬ 
der to look again at the passages relating to the invisible 
world already quoted from the Bhagvat Geeta, making 
those changes winch a reference of the texts to the finite 
instead of the infinite abyss, will render necessary. 

But to proceed. God is a self-existent (that is, a self¬ 
living) being, and has, therefore, power to create. Man, 
by virtue of his energy as a living essence, has the power of 
originating new conceptions, the power of creating in a 
finite manner; but God, possessing an infinite life, has an 
infinite creative power. 

By virtue of this creative power, the universe is evi¬ 
dently, from all eternity, possible ; that is, the universe must 
have existed, from all eternity, in potenlia. 

3 * 


( 30 ) 

This possibility is, therefore, itself uncreated ; for God, 
being self-living, cannor, by any possibility, exist without 
the poioer to create. For when we say that a thing exists 
in possibility , or is possible , we mean that some active 
agent has the power to bring it to pass. The words pos¬ 
sible and power , come from the same root. 

The abyss, the invisible or potential world, exists, there¬ 
fore, from eternity ; it is uncreated, dependent not upon 
the will, but upon the being of the self-living God. 

But, perhaps, this explanation, as it now stands, is not 
altogether satisfactory. We say then that the abyss, the 
potential world, the original possibility of things, is uncre^ 
ated. Why ? For this reason—if God created the orig¬ 
inal possibility, that creation of the original possibility, was 
itself possible with God ; here a new possibility rises up 
behind the possibility first considered, and this new possi- 
bdity is a prior condition requisite to the very being of the 
possibility first considered. If we treat this new possibili¬ 
ty, (which we have found—on the hypothesis that the orig¬ 
inal possibility was created— to be prior to that original 
possibility itself), if we treat this new possibility as we did 
the other, still another possibility will rise up behind this 
new possibility, and so on to infinity. If, therefore, the 
original possibility was created, that possibility was by no 
means original, for it must have been preceded by another 
possibility, and this last by another ; all which is evidently 
absurd. J 

The possibility of a particular act of creation is a condi¬ 
tion logically prior to the creative act itself; for if the par- 


t si ] 

ticular creation be impossible, it will evidently never take 
place. The possibility is not made to be by the very fact 
of creation, for the particular creation would have remained 
possible, although the actual creation had never taken place. 
The greater portion of the abyss, the greater part of the 
possibilities of things, have indeed not yet been realized, 
and, in all probability, they never will be. The possibility 
of an act of creation is therefore a condition logically prior 
to, and independent of, that act itself; and this reasoning 
applies as well to the first act of creation as to any other. 
The possibility of creation, the universe in polenlia , the 
abyss, therefore, existed before the very first act of crea¬ 
tion, and is, therefore, itself uncreated —the proposition that 
was to be proved. 

We are now able to see the bearing of a profound ex¬ 
pression recorded in the Vedas. 44 Waters [fluids in most 
of the ancient systems represented the abyss,] waters alone 
there were ; this world originally was water. In it the 
Lord of creation moved, having become air : he saw this 
earth, and upheld it, assuming the form of Varacha. The 
Lord of creation meditated profoundly upon the earth, and 
created the Gods, the Vasas, the Rudras , and the Mityas : 
these gods addressed the Lord of creation, saying, How 
can we form creatures ? He replied, As I created you by 
profound contemplation , so do you seek in devotion the 
means of multiplying creatures.” Thus, according to the 
Vedas, this visible universe was created out of the abyss of 
essence but non-existence, by the profound contemplation 
of the Lord of creation, that is, by a method analogous to 
that of the production oj conceptions and images in human 
thought. As the facts in the memory of man are distinct 
from, though dependent upon, him, so the invisible world, 
or the abyss, (which is, as it were, the vacant expanse of 


( 32 ) 


the infinite memory,) is distinct from God, though depend- 
ent upon him ; and, as it requires a living and personal man 
to create a poem, or other work of memory and imagina¬ 
tion, so it requires a living and personal God, to create this 
transcendent poem which we call nature and man, or the 
visible universe. So this world is the thought of God, but 
that thought rendered firm and stable, in its manifold rela¬ 
tions, by the simple volition of the Divine mind ; for the 
worlds were created by the will of God. 

But here, a confusion of thought, leading to pantheism, 
must be noticed ; and this more especially as the Oriental 
philosophers invariably became bewildered, and identified 
God with the Abyss. We wish the reader to bear in mind 
that in this assertion of the self-existence of God, superior 
to the Abyss, we separate ourselves from the Oriental sys¬ 
tems. The writers of the Vedas undoubtedly believed in 
the personality of God, but when they came to write, they 
found the thought too powerful for them, and sought to 
shelter their weakness in the pantheistic hypothesis. We 
are far from endeavoring to vindicate the Oriental sys¬ 
tems, yet we think the writers of the Vedas ought to have 
the credit of half seeing the truth we have been endeavoring 
to explain. But to proceed :—when we form a concep¬ 
tion, we gather the detached portions together in the mem¬ 
ory, and the complete conception starts up, as it were, be¬ 
fore us. But we can bring no element into our conception 
which we have not previously acquired by experience, 
which we do not retain as a fact of memory ; all things must 
exist in the memory before they can enter and become a 
part of the conception. When, however, the conception 
is formed, we recognize that it is distinct from us, that it is 
not ourselves, but an image, a mental picture, dependent 
upon us for its continuance in existence. If we withdraw 
our attention it vanishes. It depends upon us for our cxis - 


( 33 ) 


/cnee, but our existence does not depend upon it. We do 
not flow into the conception, it does not partake of our es¬ 
sence, yet we sustain it, and, if we withdraw our sustain¬ 
ing energy, it returns again into the potential state in the 
vacant expanse of memory ; it will no longer be a picture 
actually existing before our minds. We would here re¬ 
mark, by the way, that no picture, no representation, can 
exist in the mind ; for the mind is simple, and therefore 
without any capacity of including space, and, where there 
is no space, the use of the word within is absurd. The 
picture is present to the mind, not in the visible world, but 
in the invisible world of memory and imagination, where 
indeed there is space, but of another order from the space 
of the visible world. A further investigation of this matter 
would require psychological developments wholly incom¬ 
patible with the nature of this article ; we are concerned at 
this moment, not with psychology, but with ontology. 

The early Hindoo philosophers knew very well that God 
was self-living, and superior to the Abyss, but they always 
became entangled in their speculations, till they confounded 
the Abyss with the Divine Nature itself. Sometimes they 
say the Abyss is God, which is atheism, for the Abyss is 
evidently dead, and to say that God is dead, is but another 
way, of saying that there is no God. This is not the doc¬ 
trine of the Orthodox sects, but of the heretics, the 
Buddhists for example. Sometimes, however, the most 
Orthodox writers affirm, in the same passage, the self¬ 
living, personal, existence of God, and the divinity of the 
Abyss ; which assertion of contradictory things produces 
inextricable confusion. An example may be found in the 
beginning of the Laws of Menu — 

“ This universe existed only in the first Divine idea, yet unexpanded, as 
if involved in darkness, imperceptible, undefinable, undiscoverable by rea¬ 
son, and undiscovered by revelation, as if it were wholly immersed in sleep. 


( 34 ) 


“ He, having willed to produce various beings from his own divine sub¬ 
stance, first with a thought created the waters, and placed in them a pro¬ 
ductive seed. 

“ The seed became an egg, bright as gold, blazi ng like the luminary with 
a thousand beams; and in that egg he was born himself, in the form of 
Brahma, the great forefather of all spirits. 

“ The waters were called nara , because they were the production of Na- 
ra, or the Spirit of God ; and since they were his first ayana, or place of 
motion, he thence is named Narayana, or moving on the waters. 

“ From that which is, the first cause, not the object of sense, existing 
everywhere in substance, not existing to our‘perception, without beginning 
or end, was produced the divine male, famed in all worlds under the appel¬ 
lation of Brahma. 

“ He whose powers are incomprehensible, having thus created both me 
and this universe, was again absorbed in the Supreme Spirit, changing the 
time of energy for the time of repose. 

“ When that Power awakes, (for though slumber be not predicable of the 
sole eternal Mind, infinitely wise, and infinitely benevolent, yet it is predica¬ 
ted of Brahma, figuratively, as a general property of life,) then has this 
world its full expansion ; but when he slumbers with a tranquil spirit, then 
the whole system fades away : 

“ For while he reposes, as it were, in calm sleep, embodied spirits, endued 
with principles of action, depart from their several acts, and the mind itself 
becomes inert. 

“ And when they are once absorbed in that supreme essence, then the 
Divine Soul of all beings withdraws his energy, and placidly slumbers. 

“ Then, too, this vital soul of created bodies, with all the organs of sense 
and of action, remains long immersed in the first idea, or in darkness, and 
performs not its natural functions, but migrates from its corporeal frame. 

“ Thus the immutable Power, by waking and reposing alternately, reviv¬ 
ifies and destroys, in eternal succession, this whole assemblage of locomo¬ 
tive and immovable creatures.” 

The Orientals held, as a very general thing, the Abyss 
to he God. The visible universe is nothing other than the 
Aby ss itself, proceeding from the potential state into actual 
relations—proceeding from invisibility to visibility. Hence 
the invisible world, if it have a substantial existence, (which 
it must have, if it be identical with God,) is the substance of 
the visible, so that there would be but one substance or being 
in the universe ; for the Abyss, as has been already shown, 
is one. The universe, therefore, while in the potential state 


« 


( ,35 ) 

Would be God, but after it has proceeded forth from invisi® 
bility to visibility, it is the actual world. Thus God is sup* 
posed to be the substance of the visible world. While 
things are in their actual relations, they are not God, but 
when they return into their primordial source, they are God ; 
for each thing according to its potential existence is of the 
Abyss, and it is the ichole Abyss, for the very being of the 
Abyss consists in this, that all which distinguishes one thing 
from another is swallowed up, destroyed. It is probably 
for these or similar reasons, that some of our subjective Ide¬ 
alists (Transcendentalists) affirm that “ they are God when 
they are out of the body, but not God when in the body.” 

In fact, our Transcendentalists believe, as we have al¬ 
ready seen, “ that this visible universe is a procession from 
some unknown centre in the Transcendentalist himself.” Is 
it not evident, therefore, that when the universe enters its 
primordial source, it will enter the Transcendentalist himself, 
since it is from him that all things originally proceed ? This 
is the genesis of Transcendentalism :—the thinker identifies 
the Abyss with himself, calling the Abyss God, and then 
says that he creates and destroys the universe, in alternating 
seasons of energy and repose. He uses the words of 
Kreeshna, saying, Cl There is not anything greater than I ; 
and all things hang on me, even as precious gems on a string. 
I am entity and nonentity ; I am death and immortality. I 
now draw in, and I now let out.” And evidently, if the 
Transcendentalist enters the potential state, he is the whole 
Abyss ; for he can enter that state only by destroying every 
quality which distinguishes him from the rest of the universe. 
But by what right does he affirm himself to be the whole 
actual universe, even though grant that he is the whole uni¬ 
verse in potenlia ? If a man enter the potential state, as is 
very evident from the preceding considerations, he dies , and 


( 36 ) 

does by no means become greater than he was. A Tran* 
scendentalist ought not, therefore, to affirm himself to be all 
things, but rather, on the contrary, to affirm himself to be 
dead. Our Transcendental friends have not always mani* 
fested this wisdom. 

We will make another quotation from the Bhagvat Geela* 
and then pass to the next general head : 

“ This whole world was spread abroad by me in my invisible form. All 
things depend on me, and I am not dependent upon them. Behold my di 
vine connection. My creative spirit is the keeper of all things, not the de¬ 
pendent. Understand that all things rest in me as the mighty air, which 
passeth everywhere, resteth in the etherial space. At the end of the for¬ 
mation, at the end of the day of Brahma, all things, O son of Koontee, re¬ 
turn into my primordial source, and, at the beginning of another formation, 
I create them all again. I plant myself in my own virtue, and create, 
again and again, this assemblage of beings, this whole, from the power of 
nature without power. Those works confine not me, because I am like one 
that sitteth aloof, uninterested in those works. By my supervision, nature 
produceth both the movable and the immovable. It is from this source, O 
Arjoon, that the universe resolveth.” 

How different is this doctrine from that of the Vedas ! 
The text of the sacred books is intermixed with errors, but 
still they assert the existence of a creative God ; while here, 
in the Rhagvat Geeta, the Deity is identified with the Abyss— 
that is, his being is denied. 

“ As the spider spins, and gathers back its thread (say 
the Vedas) ; as plants sprout out of the earth ; as hairs grow 
on a living person ; so is this universe produced from imper¬ 
ishable nature. By contemplation the Vast One germinates.” 
In the first sentence we have indeed the procession of all 
things from the Abyss, the visible resting for its substantial 
being upon the invisible ; but in the second, we find the asser¬ 
tion of a living and personal God ; for, it is by contempla¬ 
tion that the Vast One germinates, that is, the Vast O ie is 
a contemplative agent, a living person. But the Vast One 


( 37 ) 

is identified with the Abyss, the Abyss is made to be alive, 
and from this admixture of incongruous thoughts flows forth, 
as usual, an-inextricable confusion. 

VII. We are not particularly interested in the doctrine 
of transmigration : let us speak rather of the merging of the 
soul in the Oversoul—of absorption, of the reentrance of 
the soul into the original universal unity of indifferance, of 
its return to the Abyss. According to the Oriental Theol¬ 
ogy, a man must, in this world, crucify every affection, ev¬ 
ery tendency, and endeavour to be, at the moment of death, 
in the state described in the quotation from Dupuis : thus, 
and thus only, can he escape the return , the necessitv of 
transmigrating. “ At the end of life (says Kreeshna, who 
is the Abyss), he, who having abandoned his mortal frame, 
departed] thinking only of me, without doubt goeth unto 
me : or else, if he think not of me, but of other things, 
whatever nature he shall thus call upon at the end of life, 
when he shall quit his mortal frame, he shall go into it 
(transmigrate).” When a man dies who is without affec¬ 
tion, whose mind is fixed upon the Abyss, upon the univer¬ 
sal unity of indifference, he will not take any form, for he 
has no particular character or tendency, but will at once en¬ 
ter into the potential state. But this reentrance into the 
potential state seems to be annihilation (though the essence 
of the soul subsists) rather than immortality. Kreeshna is 
the Abyss, and the highest state of future happiness, held 
out by the Bhagvat Geeta, consists in a return into Kreesh¬ 
na. In this state of essence without existence, we should 
indeed be free from the danger of migration, for we should 
be thenceforth free from all relations whatever ; but no fu¬ 
ture life is compatible with such an order of being. We 
should like to know how our Transcendentalists answer the 
objections brought against the doctrine of the Bhagvat Gee¬ 
ta. Their whole desire is to reenter into themselves, to be 
4 


( 38 ) 

absolved from all dependency upon anything which is not 
themselves. How do they escape the Abyss ? How do 
they avoid a return into Kreeshna, into u the Supreme 
Abode ?” Their only argument for immortality is the met¬ 
aphysical one, derived from the fact of the soul’s simplici¬ 
ty ; bnt this proves only that the soul’s being is imperisha¬ 
ble, it proves nothing in relation to a future life. 

Here are some intimations of the rule of life which ought 
to be followed by the aspirant after immersion in Kreeshna : 

“ Those men of regulated lives (says Kreeshna) whose sins are done 
away, being freed from contending passions, enjoy me. .... He, O Arjoon, 
who, from conviction, acknowledgeth my divine birth and actions to be 
even so, doth not, upon his quitting his mortal frame enter into another, 

for he entereth into me .They who serve me with adoration, I am in 

them , and they in me .Wise men who have abandoned all thought of 

the fruit which is produced from their actions, are freed from the chains 
of birth, and go to the regions of eternal happiness. ... A man is said to 
be confirmed in wisdom when he forsaketh every desire which entereth 
into his heart, and of himself is happy, and contented in himself. . . . The 
wisdom of that man is established, who, in all things, is without affection f 
and having received either good or evil, neither rejoiceth at the one, nor 
is cast down by the other. His wisdom is confirmed, when, like a tortoise, 
he can draw in all his members, and restrain them from their wonted 
purposes. The hungry man loseth every object but the gratification of his 
appetite, and, when he is become acquainted with the Supreme, he loseth 
even that. . . . The man whose passions enter his heart as the waters run 

into the unswelling, passive ocean, obtaineth happiness.The man 

whose mind is led astray by the pride of self-sufficiency thinketh that he 
himself is the executor of all those actions which are performed by the 
principles of his constitution. But the man who is acquainted with the 
two distinctions of cause and effect, will give himself no trouble. . . . The 
man who, employed in the practice of works, is of a purified soul, and a 
subdued spirit, and whose soul is the universal soul , is not affected by so 
being. 

But is there no adequate answer to the question of the 
soul’s immortality t Can we not do better than follow out 
these abstruse speculations ? Let us try, at least, to escape 
from the consequences of all these pantheistic hypotheses. 


[ 





( 39 . ) 

First, then, what is death, or the transition from this life to 
that which is to come ? Death is not the contrary of being 
or of existence, for the contrary to being is nonentity, and 
the contrary to existence is non-existence ; death is contra¬ 
ry to life, and hardly that. Death is the passage of a vital 
agent from one state of existence to another. A man, when 
he leaves this present state for the future world, is said to 
die, though it is not to be supposed that his soul ceases for 
a moment to live. Is the death of the soul conceivable ? 
Endeavor to conceive of yourself as dead—make the at¬ 
tempt. Do you not still find yourself a living agent, con¬ 
templating some imaginary picture, which you have conjur¬ 
ed up before your mind, and which represents yourself as 
dead. Make the attempt again. Evidently it is fruitless ; 
no man can conceive of himself as dead. We may indeed 
conceive of ourselves as dead to this present state, as hav¬ 
ing departed from the present body, but not as totally dead. 
A man may die as to this present body, but he is immedi¬ 
ately born into a new, a higher state ; for the soul, (speak¬ 
ing without reference to the particular state of existence,) 
does not cease to live. To die, therefore, is not to cease 
from all life, but to cease from this present form of life 
which we enjoy in the body. The soul, absolutely speak¬ 
ing, never dies, it merely dies relatively, it merely dies in 
relation to that form of life which it lived in the body. 

The philosophical arguments, however, which are gene¬ 
rally adduced in favor of the immortality of the soul, are 
good for nothing. Perhaps it will be well to examine a few 
of them. The first is derived from the simplicity of the 
soul ; this is the metaphysical argument. The soul is sim¬ 
ple, that is, not made up of parts, therefore indecomposa¬ 
ble, therefore indestructible. Granted. But this only 
proves that the soul, quoad being, will never cease ; the 
same may be said of every particle of matter. When the 


.(•40 ) 


body is destroyed the particles are not destroyed ; they go 
into new relations ; what was once wheat or grain is now a 
man, and what was once a man is now some animal— Cl all 
flesh is grass,” but does this proverb prove that each par¬ 
ticle of matter enjoys immortality ? The question is, whe¬ 
ther the soul in its future state will continue not merely to 
be, but to live. The question is not concerning persist¬ 
ence in being, but concerning future life. The metaphysi¬ 
cal argument proves nothing in relation to immortality. The 
soul lives now in the body, is dependent upon the body for 
its communion with outward nature : it cannot learn or know 
anything of the visible world except through the medium of 
the senses ; and without the cunning organization of the ear, 
human speech and the communion of man with'man, and 
therefore, human sympathies, and, in short, human life, 
would be impossible. Who does not know the influence 
of spirituous liquor, tobacco, and opium, upon the memory ? 
Do these material agents act directly on the soul ? Evi¬ 
dently not ; but they act on the body, and this weakening 
of the memory by material agents operating on the body, 
shows us that the soul is dependent, for the continuance of 
the exercise of memory and imagination, to a certain ex¬ 
tent, upon its connection with the body. Who shall say, 
upon the strength of the metaphysical argument only, that 
the soul, on its separation from the body does not enter the 
Abyss, does not enter the potential state ? Is there any 
life there, any immortality in the Abyss, which men would 
desire ? 

Again, there is the Platonic argument, which goes on the 
ground that we lived in some celestial region before we were 
born into the world. We are willing to grant that we sub¬ 
sist in essence from eternity to eternity, but how can it be 
proved that we lived before we were born ? if it be difficult 
to prove that our life continues after death, much more dif- 


( 41 ) 

ficult is it to prove that we have lived formerly, before we 
entered the present state of existence ! Plato adduces no 
adequate evidence. Then comes the argument from con¬ 
sciousness. Some say they are conscious they will live 
hereafter. Consciousness, we believe, gives us knowledge 
concerning the immediate operations of our own minds, and 
concerning these only. The argument from consciousness, 
is, therefore, not absurd, but ridiculous. We know a lady 
who denies the Christian miracles, and when asked why she 
denies them, answers, “ I am conscious that they never 
happened.” This is a specimen of the argument from con¬ 
sciousness. The fact is, such persons really mean, when 
they say they are conscious of the reality of a fact concern¬ 
ing which they have no certain knowledge, that their belief 
in that direction is very strong. But strong belief is no 
valid philosophical evidence. The argument from con¬ 
sciousness is unphilosophical, and, as no person capable of 
adducing such argument will be able to wade through the 
foregoing paragraphs on the Abyss, and thus reach this place 
where his opinions are noticed, we dismiss the subject from 
further consideration. 

For ourselves, we know of no good argument for the im¬ 
mortality of the soul, except the one so philosophically set 
forth by our Saviour and the apostle Paul. We shall en¬ 
deavour to explain briefly the metaphysics of the Christian 
doctrine of immortality, striving meanwhile to adventure as 
little as possible into the dark regions of theological contro¬ 
versy. Our questions are of Zi/e, eternal life , and of the 
means of sustaining life. 

Man is dependent, for the continuance of his life, upon 
that which is not himself. There is no life in the Abyss, 
where all relations have vanished ; there is no life in pure 
4* 


( 42 ) 

essence, but only in existence. Life ceases when man en¬ 
ters the Abyss : it commences when he emerges from the 
Abyss, and enters into relations. Man’s life is in concur¬ 
rence, in relations. The activity of the soul, whereby it 
enters into relations, is the life of the soul. The act of 
passing from the state of essence into that of existence, is 
life. Life, therefore, depends upon the soul, and upon that 
with which it is in relations ; for the activity, which is the life, 
changes its character according as it is in relations with dif¬ 
ferent objects. Man lives, in the order of the natural life, 
£by eating food ; he lives, by being brought, through the ope¬ 
rations of the organs of sense, into relations with this visible 
and tangible world. Deprive man of nourishment, and he 
dies. Destroy his organs of sense, and he sinks into the 
condition described in the quotation from Dupuis.—But this 
body will be dissolved, this earthly tabernacle must be with¬ 
drawn ; when, therefore we lose this body, which is the in¬ 
strument whereby we are brought into relation with that 
which is not ourselves, how do we know that we shall not be 
cut off from all concurrence, from all relation ? The man 
who has no life higher than that of the body, has no well 
grounded hope of immortality ; for the body will one day be 
disorganised, and will return to its original elements. 

Is there any life different from that of the body, and, if 
there is such a life, how shall man obtain it ? Is there a 
spiritual world with which we may be in immediate relations, 
even as we are in relation with the natural world mediate¬ 
ly through the body. 

If there is a spiritual world with which the soul can come 
into immediate relations, then the soul can live two lives at 
once, one natural in the body, and the other spiritual in com¬ 
munion with this spiritual world. If the body is destroyed 



( 43 ) 

this spiritual life will not cease with the life in the body ; 
for, by the hypothesis, it is independent of the body, con¬ 
sisting in an immediate concurrence with spiritual things. 
When the body decays, the soul will not return into the 
Abyss, for it will continue in actual, though spiritual rela¬ 
tions. As the body is sustained by natural nourishment, so 
the soul will be sustained by spiritual nourishment. 

If the Soul, can, while in the body, come into immedi¬ 
ate relations with Christ, then it will live one life imme¬ 
diately with Christ, even while it lives another, and a nat¬ 
ural life, mediately, through the body. The destruction of 
the body,will not affect the life in Christ, because this last 
life is in him immediately , and independently of the body. 
Therefore, to make our hope sure and steadfast of eternal 
life , we must know certainly (1) That we may come into 
immediate communion with our Lord, that we may have 
life in him independently of our life in the body, and (2) 
That he himself is imperishable ; for as he is the object 
w ? ith which we commune, his continuance is necessary to 
the continuance of our life ; since, if he should perish, if he 
should return to the state of essence but non-existence, we 
should at once be thrown out of all concurrence, relation, 
and communion, by the disappearance of the object of our 
life, and thus we should be thrown back into the Abyss. 

% 

Has our Lord eternal life , so that he remains forever im- 
perishably in relations, in existence ? 

Can we attain to immediate communion with Christ, so as 
to obtain, in him, that eternal life which he possesses ? 

To obtain an answer to these questions, let us consult the 
Scriptures. 


( 44 ) 


(1.) Can we sustain a spiritual life in Christ, by making 
him, his truth, his doctrine, our spiritual nourishment, even 
as we sustain our natural lives by partaking of natural food ? 
Can we come into communion with Christ in a higher, 
spiritual sphere of existence, even as we come into com¬ 
munion with objects in the natural world in our life of nat¬ 
ural relations ? As we escape from the Abyss, through the 
relations of our life in the body, can we escape from the 
Abyss through a higher life which we may live in Christ ? 

I am the bread of life. I am the living bread which came down from 
heaven. If a man eat of this bread he shall live forever: and the bread 
that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world. 
The Jews therefore strove among themselves , saying , How can this man give us 
his flesh to eat ? Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath 
eternal life , and I will raise him up at the last day. He that eateth my 
flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him. It is the 
Spirit that quickeneth , the flesh profiteth nothing , the words that I speak unto 
you , they are Spirit, and they are life. . . Labour not for the meat which 
perisheth, but for the meat which endureth unto everlasting life , which the 
Son of Man shall give unto you; for him hath God the Father sealed. . . 
The bread of God is he who cometh down from heaven and giveth' life 
unto the world. I am the bread of life; he that cometh to me shall never 
hunger, and he that believeth on me shall never thirst. . . The life was 
manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that 
eternal life , which was with the Father and which was manifested to us. . . 
Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in 
him, and he in God. This is the record, that God hath given to us 
eternal life : and this life is in his Son. He that hath the Son, hath life; 
and he that hath not the Son of God, hath not life. 

We have boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a 
new and living way, which he hath consecrated for us, through the vail, 
that is to say, his flesh . . . God hath appointed us to obtain salvation by 
our Lord Jesus Christ, who died for us, that, whether we wake or sleep, we 
should live together with him ... If any man be in Christ, he is a new crea¬ 
ture : old things are passed away : behold, all things are become new .,. 

If Christ be in you the body is dead, because of sin; but the spirit is 
life , because of righteousness. W e, being many, are one body in Christ, 
and every one members one of another . . .For no one of us liveth to him¬ 
self, and no man dieth to himself, for whether we live, we live unto the 


( 45 ) 


Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord ; whether we live, there¬ 
fore, or whether we die, we are the Lord’s. For to this end Christ both 
died, and rose, and revived, that he might be Lord both of the dead and 
the living . . . Coming to the Lord as unto a living stone , disallowed indeed 
of men, but chosen of God, and precious, ye also, as living stones , are built 
up a spiritual house, a holy priesthood, to offer spiritual sacrifices, accept¬ 
able to God by Jesus Christ. 

I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he 
were dead, yet shall he live : and he that liveth and believeth in me, shall 
never die . . . Thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he should give 
eternal life to as many as thou hast given him. And this is life eternal , that 
they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou 
hast sent . . . God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, 
that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life .. 
As the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them ; even so the Son 
quickeneth whom he will . . . He that heareth my word, and believeth on 
him that sent me, hath everlasting life , and shall not come into condem¬ 
nation ; but is passed from death unto life. 

(2). But perhaps it is not enough that we should be able 
to live directly in Christ. We know the substance of our 
being to be indestructible ; but we must know also that our 
Lord lives always in relations ; for, otherwise the doctrine 
would be by no means satisfactory. If he does not live al¬ 
ways in relations, then, when he dies, when he reenters the 
Abyss, our lives which we live in him will cease ; for we 
cannot remain in relations with that which has reentered the 
A.byss. In order, therefore, that our hope may be sure and 
steadfast, we must satisfy ourselves that our Lord lives di¬ 
rectly in the Father —who alone has immortality in his own 
strength. If our Lord lives directly in the Father, then his 
life is imperishable ; for his substance is permanent of its 
own nature, and the life of the Father cannot cease. If the 
life of our Lord is. imperishable, independent of all time, of 
all change—capable of subsisting although the whole visible 
universe enters into non-existence, into the potential state— 
then our lives which we live in him, will be imperishable al¬ 
so, for our souls, through him, will be involved in imperish- 


( 46 ) 


able relations, relations altogether independent of the body, 
relations altogether independent of all material and visible 
existences. What do the Scriptures teach upon this head ? 
Do they teach us that our Lord came in his own strength, 
or in the strength of a communion with his Father ? 


As the Living Father hath sent me, and I live by the t .Father ; so he that 
eateth me, even he shall live by me . . . As the Father hath life in himself, 
so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself. . . I came forth from 
the Father, and am come into the world : again, I leave the world, and 
go unto the Father . . . My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me. 
I proceeded forth, and came from God; neither came I of myself, but he 
sent me ... 0 righteous Father, the world hath not known thee: but I 
have known thee, and these have known that thou hast sent me. And 
now, O Father, glorify me with thine own self, with the glory which I 
had with thee before the world was . . . All things are delivered unto me of 
my Father; and no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither know- 
eth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son 
shall reveal him . . . Verily, verily, the Son can do nothing of himself, 
but what he seeth the Father do: for what things soever he doeth, these 
also the Son doeth likewise. For the Father loveth the Son, and show- 
eth him all things that himself doeth. For, as the Father raiseth up the 
dead, and quickeneth them; even so the Son quickeneih whom he will . . . 
The hope set before us we have as an anchor of the soul, both sure and 
steadfast, and which entereth into that within the vail; whither the fore¬ 
runner is for us entered, even Jesus, made a high priest forever after the 
order of Melchisedec . . . He is able to save them to the uttermost who 
come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them. 

Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he who is of God; he hath 
seen the Father ... He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father . , . 
Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me 1 The 
words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself; but the Father that 
dwelleth in me, he doeth the works ... I and my Father are one . . . 
My Father is greater than I . . . Holy Father, keep through thine own 
name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we are one. 


(3) One difficulty still remains. Our Lord was crucifi¬ 
ed, he died, and was buried : We also must die and be bu¬ 
ried, our mortal bodies must return to the dust. It is evi¬ 
dent, therefore, that death has great power over us, not¬ 
withstanding the divine life we live in Christ. What is the 


( 47 ) 

limit of this power ? How do the scriptures answer the dif* 
ficulty here indicated ?—By the doctrine of the resurrec* 
tion of the dead. 


Though Christ was crucified through weakness, yet he liveth by the 
power of God. . . . Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down 
my life, that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay 
it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to 
take it again. 

I cotint all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ 
Jesus my Lord: for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do 
count them but dung, that I may win Christ, and be found in him, not 
having my own righteousness, which is of the law, but that of the faith of 
Christ, the righteousness Which is of God by faith : that I may know him, 
and the ■power of his resurrection , the fellowship of his sufferings, being made 
conformable unto his death; if by any means I might attain unto 
Yhe resurrection of the dead. .. If we have been planted together 
in the likeness of Christ’s death, we shall also in the likeness of his resur¬ 
rection. . . , Now, if we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also 
live with him : knowing that Christ, being raised from the dead , dieth no 
more; death hath no more dominion over him. ... If the Spirit of him 
that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ 
from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that 
dwelleth in you. . . . 

If then ye be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above, where 
Christ sitteth on the right hand of God. Set your affections on things 
above, not on things on the earth. For ye are dead , and your lives are hid 
with Christ in God. When Christ , who is our life , shall appear , then shall ye 
also appear with him in glory , ... We have been begotten again into a live¬ 
ly hope by the resurrection of Christ from the dead. ... We are kept by 
the power of faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time. . . 
When the chief Shepherd shall appear, ye shall receive a crown of glory 
that fadetli not away. . . . For our conversation is in heaven ; from whence 
also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ: who shall change 
our vile body that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, accord¬ 
ing to the working whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself. . . 

Yet a little while, and the world seeth me no more, but 

YE SEE ME t BECAUSE I LIVE, YE SHALL ALSO. At THAT DAY YE 
SHALL KNOW THAT I AM IN MY FATHER, AND YOU IN ME, AND I IN 
YOU. 

It is evident from the foregoing passages of scripture, 


( 48 ) 


and from others which we have neither time nor space to 
quote, that the scriptural argument for the' immortality of 
the soul rests on the single foundation of the historical fact 
of our Lord’s resurrection. If our Lord really rose from 
the dead, then the argument for the soul’s future life', is 
good and adequate ; but if the history of Christ’s resurrec¬ 
tion is an allegory, or a mere myth , then the immortality 
brought to light in the gospel vanishes at once. * The apos¬ 
tle spake well and logically, when he repeated twice over, 
If Christ be not raised , your faith is vain , ye are yet in your 
sins. If death had power over Christ, how can he call us 
to eternal life ? If he himself has fallen back into the 
Abyss, how can he be a source of life to us ? If our Lord 
was not raised from the dead, really and actually, then he 
was Gautama, Bouddha, Kreeshna, Vischnou even, but he 
was not the Saviour of the world. ' 

VIII. But what practical conclusion can we draw from 
the considerations brought to view in the foregoing pages ? 
For it is without doubt unbecoming in philosophers, which 
we take both ourselves and our readers to be, to waste so 
much paper, ink, time, and nervous fluid, on a mere ques¬ 
tion of curiosity. What practical conclusion can we draw ? 
It seems to us that we are justified in concluding that the 
theory of the future existence of the soul, independent of 
any body, spiritual or material, is unphilosophical, and un¬ 
worthy of being believed by any well instructed man. The 
Scriptures teach the resurrection of a body, not the natural 
body, indeed, but a spiritual body. 44 It is sown a natural 
body (says St. Paul) ; it is raised a spiritual body.” 

What in fact is meant by this term body ? A thing pro¬ 
ducing certain effects upon us, as hardness, weight, exist¬ 
ence, color, &c. Abstract these qualities, or modes of ac- 


( 49 ) 

tivity, from the particular body, and what remains ? Evi¬ 
dently nothing but the potential existence of that same body. 
Now the soul, in order to communion with other souls, 
must have some mode of activity, and some means of re¬ 
cognizing the activities of other souls ; that is, it must exist 
in actual relations, that is, again, in a body, either spiritual 
or material—it must not have entered the Abyss. For the 
existence of the body, as we have seen, consists in these 
actual relations ; as, for example, color, hardness, weight, 
&c., in the case of material bodies. As for this term spi¬ 
ritual body ,its meaning is not altogether plain ; it probably 
signifies a body having a real existence, but an existence 
entirely different from any with which we are now acquaint¬ 
ed. We would not be misunderstood ; we do not believe 
the soul to be the substance of the body. We hold that 
the soul and body are distinct, though not separate—but 
u of making many books there is no end, and much study 
is a weariness to the flesh.” We are not prepared to write 
a dissertation upon the connection of the soul and body. 


5 











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